The global phenomenon of labor migration has given rise to two contradic tory policy perspectives about the desirability of flows and their consequences for economic development. Discussions usually focus on two aspects of the consequences of migration, the labor force implications and the role of remittances at both the macro and microleves. Social and political implications are less often discussed. When they are alluded to, discus.ion is often cursory and off-handed, with an air of idle speculation. The resulting conclusions are quite predictable and follow from authors' views about economic issues. For those with a negative view of migration's contribution to development, migration is a slippery slope to political instability and random social change without concurrent and supportive institutional adjustment. On the other hand, migration and its consequences IThe authors thank Gurushri Swamy, Hania Zlotnik, Sharon Stanton Russell and Elizabeth H. Steven for their help and advice, for the use of which we bear responsibdlity.
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-. e.Q. C I9 5 maintain political peace for the optimists. Migration propels social changes viewed as integral parts of in families, gender roles and so on that are economic development and fit into an history ofsecular changes that cannot ultimately be avoided.
The negative view of inzernational migration is built on an argument with four parts: dependency, instability, developmental distortion and a resulting economic decline that overshadows the temporary advantage for a fortunate minority of beneficiaries (other author. have noted and dis cussed this debate, often couched in cost-benefit language; See, e.g., Stahl, 1982; Russell, 1986; Finkle and McIntosh, 1982) .
omr.odities. Importers Migration, in this view, '.s like the export of control the market price; in the case of labor because supply isso bountiful. The probability of cartel formation by labor exporters isminimal. Sending countries, in sho't, are in a depend:nt position at dir mercy of a market they do not control -nd which they can only minimally influence (Rhoda, 1979:79-80) .
The image isgraphically summed up in a comparison of dependence on remittances with drug addiction:
Despite the foreign exchange and balance of payments advantages, do remittances help the development process or, like drug dependency, do their existence and current use primarily feed the need for more foreign exchange and exacerbate the balance of payments process, thus increasing the need for even more jemittances and the acconi panying dependency on receiving countries? (Kritz and Keely, 1981: xxv).
Aligned with the dependency produced by reliance on remittances istheir instability as a source of national income. Remittances are viewed as unpre can presumably have wide swings dictable because manpower demands (Birks and Sinclair, 1980:1) .
Just as remittances can rise rapidly due to a feverish build up ofmanpower demand (as in Europe in the late 1950s and 1960s and especially in die AAab oil producers following i973), so too there can be a steep drop in remittances due to rapid repatriation. The inevitable decline in remittances would be aided 1)by a decline in wage rates as overheated economies cool off; 2) by a decline in real wages due to inflation that leaves less to send home; and S) by the propensity of workers to settle and be joined by family and, thus, have less incentive to remit or to remit as much as when families were separated (Birks and Sinclair, 1980:106) .
Remittances are presented as a roller coaster ride of steep ascents and declines, tied as they are to numbers ofworkers and wages (Swamy, 1981: I and 38). If labor demand falls, fewer workers go abroad and if current workers move their families overseas, remittances may drop and the decline can be "substantial and probably sudden" (so predicted Birks and Sinclair for the Middle East, 1980:106).
Beyond fostering dependency and being unstable, remittances destroy the process ofeconomic development. The litanyof complaints includes that remittances are infrequently (at best) invested in capital generating ac tivities or even in job creating enterprises. Rather, they are spent on consumer goods with high import content; consumer goods which increase local demand so that wage levels are pushed up and inflation increases; or unproductive personal investment like housing or land. At the social level, remittances are accused of creating envy and eroding work Labits (See, Russell, 1986:678) .
At the root of this criticism is the fact that remittances are not bundled but are spread across tens and hundreds af thousands of households, each making independent decisions. Institutional structures providing attractive mechanisms for investment (such as shares, bonds, etc.) are usually not available in developing countries or are limited to the more sophisticated sectors ofsociety. Also, this criticism assumes that remittance receivers are supposed to save at rates far above national norms, in addition to spending on current consuinpion (food, clothing, debt repayment, catch-up medical treatment and schooling the latter two examples being classifiable of human investment for future expected returns). Ifthey do not save at above normal rates, migrants and their families are somehow selfish and un patriotic for acting like everyone else. 2 Too many people, it seems, can make decisions. Concepts like meeting basic needs are dismissed with references to short-term time horizons and a narrow, selfish focus on meeting personal needs of migrant laborers' families.
The negative view of remittances betrays a bias toward centrist and statist approaches to development planning. Development that must perk up through market forces in the economy is presumed to fail because tl., externalities; of individual decisionmakers, without the incentives and mechanisms for high savings rates in large scale capital projects, are presumed to doom the prospects of economic development. Conspicuous consumption of imported goods and inflation are assumed to be more probable than sustained growth (Birks and Sinclair, 1980:3) . For example, Birks and Sinclair (1980:103) concur with i conclusion contained in a 1977 Egyptian development plan: "growing numbers of Egyptians work abroad for very high wages, if compared with domestic salaries. These individuals 2 T-e perception itself may be inaccurate. In a World Bank sponsored study of reinittance expenditures in Bangladesh, for example, 20-30% of the net increase in household income of migrants was saved. This put those households well above the 2-3% experienced by the overall economy in the years prior to the study. See, Mahrnud and Osmani, 1980. return to Egypt possessed of high purchasing power, which they individually direct not to savings and investment, but to flagrant and luxurious orsump don." The culprits arc the migrant and his family.
Th-conclusion of this line of reasoning that views remittances as increas ing dependency, as being unpredictable and undependable and as distorting the dcvelopment process (powerfully aided, of course, by the loss of ex perience and skilled manpower causing labor botdenecks) is an economic ortunate few. Labor decline that overshadows the short-term benefits to a migration and remittances do not reduce the gap bt-ween rich and poor countries, rather they widei) it (Stahl, 1982:55) . Capital rich and developed never really com countries get the benefits of labor. Labor exporters Are pensated for the investment costs of exported labor; they must deal with resulting development bottenecds; they reap inflation and increased im task of reintegrmting and they face the ports fueled by remittances; returning migrants with unrealistically high aspirations and the resulting unemployment of a frustrated upwardly mobile group (Birks and Sinclair, 1980:3-4) . The implication, of course, is that political instability cannot be far behind.
The positive view turns each of the four arguments on its head. Interna for a tional migration is responsive to market forces, provides resources transition to otherwise unsustainable development, improves income dis tribulon, and helps a significant part of society improve its quality of life.
It is difficult to argue against the interpr:tation that market forces are responsible for the robust nature of international migration flows. Even that labor migration of the negative evaluation emphasize proponents serves the interests of migrants and their families. Governments are loathe to interfere because of the resulting difficulty in preventing such movements as well as the gains for balance of payments, access to hard currency, labor so on. The argument is about the force absorption, public income and externalities and long-term consequences of what are seen as short-term and primarily private gains. The proponents of migration argue that labor export is no more productive of dependency than export of commodities or trade in general. Control of the terms of trade often makes for unequal exchange. The dependency would not be-lessened if labor exporters were a tight competitive or other goods in trading agricultural commodities situation. It is not what is exported, but terms of trade and market control that really count.
not without some leverage, in spite of the large Labor exporters are global supply of labor. Saudi desire to influence other Arab and Islamic states, United States desire for stability amopg neighbors or those in its or French desire for Western Hemisphere, sphere of influence in the in North and West Africa are examples of some access influence and noneconomic levers. Koreans' high productivity, work quality and timely completion of projects is legendary in the Middle East and was a lever used to enter the m-rket and increase market share in construction projects. There is more to labor market competition than supply.
Migration is not an automatic boon to labor exporters. Market forces must be watched, anticipated and adjusted to. In contrast to the negative evaluation of labor migration, dependency-a kind of helpless exploitation -is not the inevitable result of labor export. Labor, like any export, requires skilled reading and reacticn to market and political forces.
Second, migration is evaluated as providing at least help in a transitional way along a path to sustained economic development. All forms of exchange are insecure in some ultimate sense. To use phrases like "decline in the volume of remittances...is inevitable" (Birks and Sinclair, 1980:106) is not analytically helpful since it is so open-ended. To denigrate the fiscal and economic advantages of migration as merely short-term misses the capacity of those advantages to help an economy move into more sustained growth, even while increasing the standard of living for contemporary citizens.
The possible distorting effects of migration and remittances must be weighed against the income redistribution effects. Far from the claims of lavish and wasteful consumption, most studies of remittance use find that remittances are spent on current consumption, health and education lead ing to improved standards of living for migrant households and higher standards compared to nonmigrant households (See, e.g., Finkle and McIntosh, 1982; Keely and Saket, 1984; Ali, 1979; Gilani 1981; Chilivumbo, 
1985).
The conclusion that flows from this more positive view of the consequen ces of migration and remittances is that macroeconomic opportunities are provided by migration that are hard to conceive being available from any other source. Though not without ,nitfalls,it seems to be myopic to presume that any government would for, go, even if it could do so, availing itself of those opportunities or that itshould do so despite the pitfalls. By implication, all gains are not merely private, but have importani:, positive macro economic effects.
At the microlevel, the positive view emphasizes the fact that a generation or more (depending on the migration stream) have lived better and have more opportunities than conceivable with any other economic development path actually (not theoretically) open to many labor exporting countries. Although only a minority ofcitizens may benefit (but a sizeable one in many cases and even a majority of the citizenry in a few cases like Jordan or Yemen), by what criteria should their advantage be traded for some pm ported future benefit to "society"?
Underlying these two general views, here only broadly sketched, are differing values placed on the long and short term; a disagreement over whether long-term inevitably means a large numbe" of people will benefit; and, finally and quite crucially, debate over the role of the state and central a the trust to be placed in individual decisionmaking in control versus market environment.
This long introduction provides a perspective to irquire about the economic role of remittances for labor exporting countries in the recent past and the poLcy and behaviora! implications for their future roles, This interpretative essay will analyze ite implications of the views outlined and test the forecasts that flow from them. Then the implications and limitations of those results will be discussed.
HYPOTHESIS ABOUT REMI7TANCE DECLINE
The negative view of remittances leads to a conclusion such as the following: 'All these factors taken together suggest that, in the near future, the decline in remittances will be substantial and probably sudden" (Birks and Sinclair, 1980:106) . Although w-itten about Arab labor exporters to the Middle East, similar conclusions have been drawn about migration to Europe and nonArab workers in Arab oil exporting countries. Similar conclusions are hinted at for labor migration in sub-Saharan Africa and in the Western Hemi sphere, although we have not located forecasts as to timing in these cases. These warnings are usually based on a condition: if migration levels decline precipitously, then remittances will also fall off rapidly and labor exporters will feel the negative economic and labor force consequences.
One would expect from this hypothesis that a graph of remittances over time would exhibit a slope for the period of decline similar to the build up of remittances. The dire forecasts, including words like sudden and substan tial, do not engender a picture of a gradual falling off of remittances. The question of timing, especially lags between a decline in the size of the labor force abroad and remittances, is left unaddressed. Presumably, there would be no lag because returned migrants can no longer remit money.
An alternative hypothesis i6equally reasonable. Declines in remittances more gradual than their build up. This is because, except under will be extreme circumstances, migrants do not all return home at once. Typically, recruitment of workers. a halt to labor migration means a halt to new Foreign residents are less likely to return home if recruitment opportunities leading to remigration are gone. One result would be that average lengths of stay by migrant workers increase. It is also likely that, despite an end to official recruitment, the inertia of existing streams leads to some continued migration, even if at a reduced level. Not only do people stay, but families often join the original migrant. This would lead one to expect a decline in remittances since family obligations are filled by the support of the family members present in the host country. However, remittances can still be expected to flow to origin countries because ofextended family obligations. Whatever the proportion of former remittances no longer sent home because of family reunification, some remittanes are to be expected and thus the remittance decline slope would not be as steep as the slope during the period of build up.
Finally, remittance declines will probably exhibit a lag when compared to declines in workers abroad. This is because some returnees will bring back large sums on their "final" return. This lumpiness in amounts remitted can even lead to increases in remittances in the early years of a decline in the number of workers. More likely, lumpiness would produce a lagged response in remittance declines. The lag in remittance declines can lull analysts to discount the expected effect of a decline in labor abroad. 3 What has been the record? There have been two experiences -Europe after the 1973 oil embargo and price rise and the Middle East in the early 1980s --that can be used as test cases. European labor importers cut recruitment after the oil crisis and economic downturn in Europe. Dire results were predicted for labor exporters from Portugal to Turkey. Similar. ly, the coincidence of an end to the constrLction cycle of the development booms, the decline in oil prices, and the global economic crisis of the early 1980s led to predictions of massive returns of labor from the Gulf States, Saudi Arabia and North Africa and the accompanying decline in remittan ces. In both cases, the withdrawal from remittance dependency was expected to be harsh.
DATA
The source of data on remittances used in this analysis is the International Monetary Fund (IMF) balance of payments data (IMF, 1987). Data were taken from the entry for unrequited transfers. More detailed daza sources, especially for recent years, include an entry for workers' remittances as a subcategory. In addition, some countries have an entry for labor income, a factor income accruing to temporary laborers away for less than twelve months. Unrequited transfers do not include goods (Swamy, 1981:6) .
The choice of using only unrequited transiers was pragmatic. The study, of which this report is part, compares data for almost 50 countries for the period 1960-1985. Resources were not available to do a detailed examina tion for each country for each year of the period to evaluate quality of data and consistency of reporting.
The amounts of remittance used for the analysis reported in the tables, therefore, have limitations. They are in probably all cases underestimates of money remitted by immigrant workers. Money that did not go through
The authors thank S.S. Russell for this suggestion. monitored channels is not reflected; remittances reported as labor income are not included; the value of non-cash remittances is not taken into account in this analysis. The effect of these gross measures on the goal of this analysis is not determinative. The major focus is on trends.
The data are reported in nominal U.S. dollars. No attempt is made to translate into constant dollars or account for exchange rate fluctuations or purchasing power. The trends, as will be seen, are so clear and strong that at this broad level of analysis, the conclusions would most probably hold no matter what adjustments and standardizations were undertaken.
REMITANCES
The data in Table 1 provide an overview of the gross amounts recorded by major remittance receiving countries from 1960 to 1985 in nominal U.S. a steady increase worldwide in the 1960s from $700 dollars. There was million to $2.6 billion, with European remittance receiving countries lead ing the way. Turkey (reported in North Africa and West Asia) experienced an increase from 6 to 120 million dollars in the same period, with most of the rise in the 1967-69 period.
In the late 1970s, the increase in global remittances was quite rapid. This reflected not only increases to labor exporters to the Middle East, but also European increases.
In the 1980s, the world economic situation has led to a decline in total remittances. Because data for Yugoslavia are not reported, the decline in If the levels in 1984-85 for Yiugoslavia are 1984-85 looks worse than it was. actually around $3 billion, which would be down from the reported $3.6 in 1983, the picture would be quite different. Worldwide remittances would Howrver, if generally be down, but the decline would be quite slight. remittances lag behind reductions in labor forces (probably true as discussed below), then further declines after 1985 can be expected.
On a global level and by broad regions, the data in Table Ido not present roller coaster. If anything, Europe exemplifies the case of a picture of a increasing remittances after suspension of labor recruitment. After plateau the year of the oil embargo and general end of ing around 1973, guestworker recruitment, remittance levels increased from Europe. Table  2 provides the data for 1970-1985 for specific countries summarized in the regional totals in Table 1 .
The countries of interest for the hypothesis about Europe are the countries of Southern Europe along with Turkey and Algeria in Table 2. as discussed The Southern European countries, like Europe in general above, generally exhibited a pause in the growth ofremittances around 1973. There is no evidence of a sudden and steep decline. To the contrary, it seems migrants adjusted to the new circumstances. Remittances generally took off with a slope steeper than that leading up to 1973 in some cases. Using 1970 as a standard of 100, an index of remittance levels was plotted for Italy Greece and Turkey. In all three cases, with a lag of from one to five ye.ars from a plateau after 1973, remittances increased at a rate equal to or greater than the 1960-1973 period. What explains the absence of a sudden decline and, in fact, a result in the opposite direction, an increase in levels of remittances after a short interval of adaptation to new conditions? The alternate hypothesis seems to provide a reasonable explanation. Many remittance senders stayed in place. Others came, legally and illegally. Reunited families continued to remit. Reunited families may not have included complete nuclear families because children may have been left at home to be raised by grandparents and to attend local schools. Returnees may have come back with large amounts of money and this lumpiness of remittance levels from an inCividual point of view may have resulted in large aggregate amounts. The last explanation seems more applicable to the plateau period around 1973. The subsequent increase in remittances in direction opposite to the one hypothesized by the negative or pessimistic view of remittances seems best explained by essentially sociological factors about setiling in and family reunification.
The European case, given the increase of remittances after the cessation of formal recruitment, may be an exception. It certainly does not confirm the forecasts of rapid decline.
The case of Arab oil exporters provides a second case study. Through the late 1970s, warnings were issued about the coming collapse of labor demand in the Gulf. The transition from large scale construction projects to opera tion of the new infrastructure in the Gulf states led to forecasts of decline in labor demand and change in its character. The change was predicted to be toward highly skilled people who would require and be permitted to have their immediate family accompany or join them abroad. The decline in the number of migrants and the changes in living arrangements due to skill levels led to omens about remittance declines. Lower oil prices were also seen as leading to decreased labor demand and to downward pressure on wages, both of which would add to the expected decline in remittances.
ILshould have come to pass, therefore, that the 1980s would have seen a rapid decline in remittances to Arab and East and South Asian sources of Middle East labor. Inspection of the countries in Table 2 under "North Africa and West Asia" 4 and under "South and East Asia" (along with Sudan under "Sub-Saharan Africa"), leads first of all to the conclusion that whatever the effect of the world economic crisis of the early 1980s on remittances, it was certainly lagged. Declines in remittances were not universal. In fact, there is quite a mixed picture. Jordan, for example, seems to have fared well. Tile Philippines seems to have been hit very hard in 1984-85. That, however, may reflect Philippine domestic issues and reluc tance to send money to the Philippines rather than causes rooted in levLls of employment or wages in the Middle East. Pakistan has experienced fluctuations in the !980s but remittance levels, after a brief 1982 pause, are higher than achieved in the late 1970s. No matter what country one looks at, and certainly it is the general picture, the data do not support the hypothesis of remittance decline that follows from the negative evaluation of migration and remittances ovtlined above.
In summary, two case studies, Europe after 1973 and the Middle East after 1980, do not support the hypothesis of sudden and rapid declines associated with a negative view of remittances. In the European case, the alternate hypothesis of a gradual deline in remittances is also not correct. Remittances increased. In the case of Middle East labor suppliers, there certainly is a lag in any response reflected in remittance levels to changes in the number and qualifications of expatriate labor. Decline is not universal and where there iS remittance decline it is genci ally gradual. The direction of remittance levels in the mid 1980s is not uniform. The future is not clear. declines in aggregate remittances have Forecasts of sudden and sharp proven incorrect in the two cases analyzed here.
IMPLICATIONS
remittance boom will Dire predictions about the bottom falling out of a probably prove to be incorrect. The sociology of the case (migrants staying on, remittances still going to extended families, lumpiness in remittances) would seem to preclude declines in remittances a-anything near the rate of their build up, at least using post World War II experience of rapid increases in remittances due to labor migrations as a guide. The two cases studied add weight to this more sober assessment of how the "natural history" of a labor migration stream develops.
Second, remittances of the order of magnitude for many of the countries in Table 2 play an extremely important role in their economies. Table 3 lists the ratios of unrequited transfers to merchandise imports and Table 4 provides the ratios of unrequited transfers to merchandise exports, both for 1970-1985. Table 3 that eremittances cover a large proportion of tie import bill for many labor exporters. This is especially notable for labor exporters to the Middle East like Sudan, Bangladesh, Egypt and Jordan. Exporters of labor to Europe such as Tt.rkey, Portugal and, to a lesser extent, Greece also have notable fractions f import bils covered by remittances.
It is clear from
Similarly, Table 4 indicates the relative inportarce of labor remittances to exports. Labor, by way ofremittances, is among the top earners of foreign currency for many labor exporters. In the aggregate, at least $25 billion dollars has been circulating to labor exporters annually from remittances in the 1980s ( Table 1) . Tables I and 2 ) and the relative importance of remittances (Tables 3 and 4) attest to their importance in global financial transactions and national economic performances. Remittances finance imports; they stimulate internal demand. How remittances are used is the link betw,en the micro and macroeconomic impacts. As yet development economics has not adjusted to incorporate large scale infusions to many actors in an economy and tracing how the money perks through the economy. The viability of many economies, it is not too much to claim, has been possible because of remittances. It is difficult to imagine a mechanism for the transfer of so much capital to so many (and often poor) countries aind to the benefit of so many of their citizens. Table I Were the hypothesis of the negative vie, of remittances true, the dis asterous results would not have been confined to individual countries but would have been global in proportion.
The aggregate amounts (
An implication of the functions of remittances for economic performan ces is that it is -n the interest of labor importing countries (and of developed and capital rich countries in general) to foster a system that so efficiently redistributes capital. It is in .iieir interest not just because labor is available or available more cheaply than it could otherwise be. Cheap labor has hidden and delayed costs that often lead to its being rejected by labor importers. But from thf: firm or employer perspective the alternatives of capital investi..nt, relocation of facilities to sites with cheaper labor or going out of business are not always attractive. Politically realistic responses to shrink ing young adult populations may be a resumption of labor importati.is. But beyond the benefit to labor importing countries -or at least employers in them -the interests of labor importers is served by maintaining a global economic and trading system. In so far as remittances contribute to economic viability of labor exporters and allow them to participate in the globa financial, trade and monetary systems, the stronger economies benefit. Not only are remittances of importance but absorption of labor force growth (including opportunities through migration for a growing technical and professional class from developing countries) also contributes to economic and political stability. If the functions of labor migration mean that its continuation is in the interests of labor importers as well as labor exporters, it may continue and even grow. This conclusion is clearly contrary to conventional wisdom. Xenophobic trends in many labor importing countriLs, the economic malaise that still hangs over the world and the negative view of labor migration that pervades many evaluations weigh in against such a view. Nevertheless, there are also good reasons to believe migration will rebound. In addition to the economic functions of migration and remittances, there are possible labor "shortages" due to the birth dearth in developed countries and to norms regarding labor force participation of women in many Arab capital-rich states. Labor need or shortages are relative and hard to predict.
Memories can be short and selective. To be sure past experienccs will affect policy and programs, but to preclude increases in legal labor importation may be premature. The United States' recent (1986) In short, a continuation and even an increase in labor migration may be important feature of global migration trends in the 1990s. There are an positive and negative arguments for this contrarian conclusion. In a nega tive way, no other mLchanisms or functional equivalents for 7oles played by are on the horizon. migration and remittances in economic performance This, however, may be the policy challenge, to develop methods to move capital that contribute to sustained growth and job creation in developing reduces the European movement countries, especially if East to West functional of remittances or demand for temporary labor. In absence equivalents yet to be identified, not only na-ional but also regional and even global economic chaos could result. It is in the interests of receiving nations, permit capital flows to use foreign labor and to therefore, to continue through remittances in exchange for that labor. International labor migra necessary for system maintenance of the global tion may be realistically economy.
More positively, the labor importers may "need", in a politically realistic way, to import labor to a greater extent in the 1990s than in the 1980s due not labor importation is to internal demographic dynamics. Whether or economically optimal, it is feasible, familiar and effective.
The dire predictions of those disenchanted with labor migration have not materialized. Migration and especially remittances have been functional and have not proven to be all that insecure and conducive to economic distortion. It is hard to make a case that, despite the costs such as labor bottlenecks, economic development among most labor exporters lags behind what it would have been ifall those workers stayed home. Some would even say such a contention is patently absurd. The failure of past forecasts may itself add to the attractivness of a labor import/export option in the 1990s.
-7k! CONCLUSION A final note is in order. 5 This article has a narrow focus on aggregate remittances and ignores other factoo i . ineconomic performance. Inevitably it leaves out much. There are presumptive links between remittances and income distribution and between remittance and inflation that require further detailed analysis. More crucially, the role of remittances in economic performances may be given too much prominence because other issues are left out. The volume of remittances between 1965 and 1985 is a fraction of the debt burden of developing economies. In some cases, remittances may help service that debt, but by no means will they solve, by themselves, the structural problems leading to it. In that perspective, remittances may help temporarily to shore up economies, but add little to alter the fundamental weaknesses. The same could be said, of course, about increases in exports up to a certain point. The reason for these statements being true has little to do with the inherent nature of remittances or merchandise exports, but much to do with the relative size of debts. Second, the differences in per cipita income between senders and receivers of migrant labor generally have been stable over the twenty year period analyzed here (but See, Stahl, 1982 , who claims a widening of the gap between senders and receivers). Pemittances may have helped countries "hold their own" but have not narrowed the per capita income gap (obviously rates of population growth also are at play in such calculations). In short, even if the dire predictions of the pessimistic vir-w have not r..aterialized, the contribution of remittances to economic performance should not be overstated.
Remittances have not declined precipitously nor led to other dire results to be expected from the pessimistic framework used by some to analyze and evaluate their functions. Nor have they generally been the transition to sustained economic growth that resulted in narrowing the North-South economic gaps. 6 The lesson from this analysis is not that the optimistic viewpoint was correct because the pcssimistic framework predictions were incorrect. Rather, it is the need to re-evaluate and reformulate a framework for analyzing '.he micro and macro fu iction and effects of remittances for economic performance of labor exporting countries based on empirical analysis of what has happened over the last three decades.
